170-I shall now revert to the Lausanne Conference

I shall now revert to the Lausanne Conference

I shall now revert to the Lausanne Conference.

The Conference was interrupted on the 4 th February, 1923. The delegations of the Entente Powers presented the draft of a Peace Treaty to our delegation.

This contained nothing but the summary of the debates that had taken place during the course of two months, This draft contained provisos that were contrary to the spirit and sense of our independence. The judicial, financial and economic provisions were, above all others, inacceptable.

We were absolutely compelled to reject this draft. In reply, our delegation wrote a letter to the following effect: “We want to sign a peace on the points about which we have come to an agreement.”

Among the numerous points discussed at the Conference, there were actually some which were acceptable to us. In this letter we also said:

“We shall examine the questions of second and third Orders. These proposals must be regarded as non-existing if they should be repudiated by the Entente Powers.”

The proposal of our delegation was not taken into consideration ; instead of a rupture they spoke of a suspension in the negotiations. The delegations of the individual states returned home. Our delega tion did the same. Regarding myself, I was just on my return journey from Western Anatolia. On the i8 th February, 1923, I met Ismet Pasha at Eski-Shehr and we returned together to Angora.

After having heard that Ismet Pasha s return to Angora coincided with mine, a strange and inexplicable mentality had apparently been shown at Angora . , . It was regarded as a disadvantage that Ismet Pasha had met me and exchanged his views with me before he had come to Angora and entered into touch with the Government and the Assembly … It was asserted that there might be people who would interpret this meeting unfavourably . . . The one who wrote this to me was Rauf Bey, President of the Council of Ministers. I naturally placed no importance on this communication. On the contrary, I arranged my journey in a way that I should meet Ismet Pasha at Eski-Shehr, in order to be able to converse with him at the earliest possible moment. After our return to Angora Ismet Pasha explained the situation in the Council of Ministers and asked for further in structions.

It was thought necessary to ask for the advice of the Assembly, The question was put before them. The debates and the discussions of the Assembly on this subject lasted for many long days.

We felt that the adherents of the opposition had become irrecon- ciliable enemies to our delegation and Ismet Pasha . . . After peace had practically been made he had not concluded it but had returned . . . The delegation had acted contrary to the orders of the Council of Ministers. 6oi The attacks which began in secret sitting of the 27 th February were continued with the same violence and passion till 6th March; I was obliged to take part in these debates from the beginning to the end.

The opposition verily gave the impression that they did not know what they wanted. The end was that the Assembly was not capable of coming to any resolution, either for or against.

We clearly understood that the opposition in the Assembly wanted to use the Peace question as a means forgiving free course to their passion.

A certain section of the Press took the trouble to stir up these passions with an astounding ardour. It was evident that it would be difficult to arrive at a solution of the Peace question in an Assembly in such a frame of mind; this was indeed very sad by the way. In the general explanation which I gave in the Assembly I represented the situation in all its points. I quoted all possible eventualities.

I said that the policy consisting of attacks against our delegation by regarding the declarations which some of the delegations of the Entente Powers had made before their return as to be true and well founded, was not a praiseworthy policy.

I declared that what we had to do was to listen to what our dele gation had to say, to accept their explanations in good faith and to judge the situation accordingly.

I declared that it was the duty of the Council of Ministers present in the Assembly to give their opinion as to whether the delegation had acted according to the instructions of the Cabinet or not.

Finally I declared that the delegation was responsible to the Council of Ministers, who on their part are responsible to the As sembly. The Assembly must give new directions to the Cabinet; based on these directions the latter must give special instructions to the delegation. It was neither useful nor possible for the Assembly to occupy themselves with details.

I also expressed my point of view regarding these directions: “It would not be possible to bring on a discussion of the temporary suspension of the Mosul question, but that it was most essential to enforce in sure and uncompromising form the independence and right of the nation and country in every administrative, political, economic, financial and other question and to obtain the complete evacuation of the redeemed territories.”

I added to my remarks the following: “Our delegation had fully and completely fulfilled the duty entrusted to them. They have maintained the dignity of our nation and Assembly. If you are desirous of bringing the Peace question to a successful issue the Assembly must also morally support the delegation to enable them to continue their work. When you act in this manner we shall be able to hope that we might enter into an era of peace.”

The debates of the Assembly regarding this question came to a standstill. But the opposition did not abstain from creating and in venting pretexts for attacks.

It was nothing new to see the opposition of the Assembly combine attacks under different forms and on different subjects.

I have told you already that the day after my departure a pamphlet under the title of “The Mohamedan Caliphate and the Grand National Assembly” had been published, in which attempts were made to incite the whole of the Assembly and the nation to revolt against us.

But before this happened there was still another manoeuvre of which I have not yet spoken to you for the reason that the effects of this intrigue which had been prepared in the beginning of December, 1922, still continued during my journey.If you will permit me, I will now say a few words about the subject which will serve to refresh your memory.

Three deputies had prepared a motion proposing a modification in the draft of the law on the election of the deputies …

I had been informed of the contents of this motion.

On the 2 nd December, during a sitting presided over by Adnan Bey, the Vice- President, the following words were heard from the Presidential seat:

“Gentlemen, a resolution of the Committee for the Modification of the Laws declares it to be indicated that we should enter into a discussion regarding the motion which demands the modification of the law on the election of deputies.”

Voices in the room replied: “Let it be read!” Two deputies accelerated the general uproar by saying:

“This is important. Let us propose that it shall be read.”

The President replied: “Gentlemen, it is usual to send back the motion to the commission without it being read.”

It is possible, Gentlemen, to read in the protocol of this sitting what was the matter in question and which were the debates that took place in the Assembly about this subject. But to save you this trouble I shall with your permission read to you verbatim part of the declarations which I made in the course of this sitting.

The President, who wanted to send the motion back to the com mission without having been read, gave me the word and I advanced the following observations: “Gentlemen, this motion pursues a special aim; this special aim being directly intended against my person I shall give you, with your permission in a few words, my opinion about it. This motion pre sented by Suleiman Nedjati Bey, deputy for Erzerum, Selaheddin Bey, deputy for Mersina, and Emin Bey, deputy for Djanik, has in direct view to rob me of my civil rights.

My birthplace is outside our present national frontiers, but that is neither an intention nor a fault on my part

Read the lines of Article 14, in which is said: To be elected a member of the Grand National Assembly a person must belong to the population of those districts which are within the present frontiers of Turkey and he must have his domicile in one of the present electoral districts.

“On the other hand immigrated Turks or Kurds can be elected under the condition that a period of five years has elapsed since their domicile.

“The place of my birth is lying unfortunately outside our present frontiers; besides I also have not since lived five years continuously in the same electoral district. My birthplace is outside our present national frontiers, but that is neither an intention nor a fault on my part.

“The reason for it is that we have only partly succeeded to arrest the efforts of our enemies who are aiming at the destruction and dis integration of our country and our nation.

“If our enemies had succeeded in realising their designs com pletely the country of these gentlemen who have given their signatures here would likewise be outside the frontiers, which may God prevent.

“In addition, if I do not fulfill the conditions demanded in this Article, that is to say, if I have not been able to live for five years continuously in the same electoral district, the reason for this is to be found in the services which I have rendered to our country. If I had made it my business to satisfy the conditions of this law, I could not have defended Ari-Burnu or Anafarta, which has made it possible for us to keep Constantinople.

“If I had been condemned to live for five years in the same place I should not have been able to oppose the enemy who was advancing on Diarbekr after having taken Bitlis and Musch; I could not have fulfilled my patriotic duty, the result of which was that Musch and Bitlis were saved.

“If I should have been desirous of fulfilling the conditions demanded by these gentlemen I should not have been allowed to form an army at Aleppo out of the ruins of the armies that evacuated Syria, which I defended against the enemy, nor could I have effectively upheld the border which we call to-day our national frontier. “I believe that the work to which I have dedicated myself hence forth is known to all of you. I have worked so much that I could not have lived for five years continuously in the same place. I believe that I have gained through these services the sympathy and love of my people and, perhaps, of the whole Mohamedan world.

“For this reason it has never entered into my mind that instead of being the object of this sympathy, I could be threatened with losing my rights as a citizen. I believed, and I still believe, that our enemies would perhaps have even tried to deprive me of the pos sibility of serving my country by an attempt on my life. But not for a single moment could I have imagined that there were people, be it only two or three, in the High Assembly who shared the same mode of thinking.

“Consequently I should like to know the following: Are these gentlemen really the interpreters of the thoughts and feelings of the people in their own electoral districts?

“And in the face of these gentlemen I say in addition:

“As deputies each of you naturally represents the whole of the nation. Does the nation think as you do?

“Who then, Gentlemen, has given you the commission of depriving me of my rights as a citizen ? From this platform I officially address this question to the High Assembly, to the population of the electoral districts of these gentlemen, to the whole nation, and I demand a reply.”

These words of mine were published by the agencies and in the Press. The nation was informed of my declarations and my questions. Protests poured in and were immediately sent to the Presidency of the Assembly from the electors themselves, from the electoral districts and from the whole country without exception, and from the whole nation. The people of the electoral districts of the deputies who had signed the motion likewise did not hesitate to express their disapproval to these deputies as well as to those who shared their views. These telegrams I keep as a precious memory because they contain a sincere proof of the love and confidence of the nation with regard to me. They form a voluminous bundle of documents. The contents of these documents has by the way been published. I will restrict myself to reading only one telegram which was addressed to me personally from a single electoral district, namely that of Riza:

“As we had the conviction that the deputies of our Sanjak would not associate themselves with the well-known motion presented by three deputies, we had not considered it necessary to write about the subject. “As, however, Osman Effendi, the deputy, boasts to the contrary in a letter we have just now received that he interested himself in thisjnotion and that he belonged to the group of the opposition, we feel the necessity of making the following declarations:

“i. (The beginning contains cordial and flattering words.) We curse this deputy who in the name of our Sanjak raises his voice against your honoured person and your worthy colleagues, who nourishes feelings of opposition against you and yours and who does not possess either authority nor position amongst us.

“He ought no longer to have the right to represent our Sanjak.

“2. Thanks be to God, there is not a single man in our Sanjak who shares the ideas of this deputy who recommends to us opposition and revolt at a moment when even those who do not profess to have a country would abstain from it.

“We send you our most humble greetings.”

Here follow the signatures.

The confusion of the spirits in the First Grand National Assembly of Turkey at the time preceding the events of which I have spoken had created a situation which could actually give rise to serious re flections.

We began to see clearly that the whole nation had the feeling that the Assembly was no longer in a condition to work. Even the members of the Assembly who judged with moderation and clear sight could not help expressing their sorrow. We could no longer hesitate. Is had become impossible to guide the serious and responsible affairs, of the nation and the country unless the Assembly was dissolvedt I also became convinced of this necessity.

One night I asked Rauf Bey, who lived in the building of the railway station, by telephone, to assemble the Council of Ministers in his house, and told him that I myself would come there.

I explained to the Council of Ministers assembled at Rauf Bey s the necessity of asking the Assembly to decide on new elections.

After a short discussion we came to an agreement with the Council of Ministers. The same night I invited the officials of the Parliament ary group of the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia to attend the meeting of the Council of Ministers.

Some of the members of this office were astonished and others found my proposal inappropriate. The debates and discussions lasted till the following day. Finally we came to an agreement with the office.

Thereupon I immediately convened a general assembly of the group. I explained the general situation of the country and the 6o6

national affairs which demanded urgent attention. I declared and proved that the Assembly was no longer capable of fulfilling this task, and explained the necessity of demanding from the Assembly the calling of new elections.

The general assembly of the group accepted my declarations favourably. Thereupon on the same day, the I st April, 1923, the question was brought before the Assembly. About 120 members presented a motion to proceed for new elections to the Assembly. The Assembly unanimously accepted a law to the effect that new elections should be ordered.

This vote of the Assembly is an important point in the history of our revolution, for through this decision the Assembly admitted the evil they were suffering from and manifested that they had under stood the ill-feeling which existed amongst the people with regard to this spectacle.

The Lausanne Conference met again on the 9 th April, 1923. Whilst our delegation were endeavouring to restore peace at Lausanne I oc cupied myself with the new elections.

We entered into the new elections by publishing our “Principles,” which are known to you.

The deputies who accepted our point of view and wanted to be come deputies, first of all told me that they accepted the “Principles and shared our views. It was my task to present the list of candidates and to publish the names of those candidates at a given time in the name of the party.

I had chosen this procedure because I knew that there were many people with different aims in view while the elections were in prepar ation who were working to have themselves elected deputies by de ceiving the people.

My declarations and explanations were accepted by the whole country with great confidence and sympathy.

The nation made the t( Principles” which I have published com pletely their own. It became evident that it was impossible for those who were in opposition to the “Principles” and even to my own personality to be elected deputies by the nation.

Some persons who individually presented themselves as candidates in some of the electoral districts actually suffered failure.

Amongst others Nurreddin Pasha, who was still in command of our I st Army, tried to get elected. This proved to be impossible for him. Later on during a bye-election at Brusa he succeeded in realising his ambition. It was clear that the Pasha for a long time had not neglected anything in the way of propaganda for the purpose of securing his election as an independent deputy.

Certain people, despairing of being successful, found ways by means of thousands of tricks to creep into our midst. Their true character became apparent when the Second Assembly met and began their work.

The second legislative period of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey coincided with a happy transition period in the history of New Turkey. Our four years fight for independence was crowned by a peace worthy of our national past.

The Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24 th July, 1923, was ratified by the Assembly on the 24 th August of the same year

The Peace signed at Lausanne on the 24 th July, 1923, was ratified by the Assembly on the 24 th August of the same year.

After the Armistice of Mudros the enemy Powers had four times made peace proposals to Turkey. The first one was the draft of Sevres. This draft had not been the result of any negotiation. It was drawn up by the Entente Powers under the presidency of M. Veni- zelos, the Greek Minister, and had been signed by Wahideddin s Government on the 10 th August, 1920.

This draft was not even regarded as a base for discussion by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

The second Peace proposition took place at the end of the London Conference which met after the battle of Inongu. This proposition actually contained some alterations of the Sevres Treaty, but it must be admitted that it included the maintenance of all stipulations in this treaty of those questions which were passed over in silence.

These proposals remained without result, and without giving rise to a discussion on our part, as meanwhile the second battle of Inongu had begun.

The third Peace proposal was made by the Foreign Ministers of the Entente Powers, who had assembled in Paris on the 22 nd March, 1922, that is to say, after the victory of the Sakaria and after the agreement arrived at with the French at Angora, at a time when a speedy offensive from our side was expected.

In these proposals the system of taking the Sevres Treaty as a base was actually abandoned, but they were in substance far from satis fying our national claims.

The fourth proposal is constituted by the negotiations which led to the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty.

For the purpose of really showing the principles which the Entente Powers intended to apply to Turkey and the result which, thanks to the national movement, was attained, I believe it useful to put the most important points of these four proposals in a concise summary:

I. FRONTIERS.

(a) Frontiers of Thrace.

At Sevres: The line Podima Kalikratia, a little in front of the Tjatjalta lines.

Proposals of March, 1921: No negotiations.

Proposals of March, 1922: A line leaving Rodosto on our side; Baba-Eski, Kirk Kilisse and Adrianople on the Greek side.

Lausanne: The Maritza line, besides Kara Agatch on our side.

(b) Smyrna zone.

In the Sevres draft the frontiers of this zone were drawn more or less through the district of Kush Adassi, Odemish, Salihli, Ak Hissar and Kemer Iskelessi.

This zone was to remain under Turkish dominion. Turkey how ever had to cede the exercise of her sovereign rights to Greece, and as a sign that Turkish sovereignty continued to exist the Turkish flag was to be flown over the outer forts of the town of Smyrna.

A local committee was to meet, who after the lapse of five years should decide upon the permanent annexation of the zone by Greece.

Proposal of March, 1921: The Smyrna zone remained under Turk ish rule. A Greek force was to be in the town, and a corps of gen darmerie in the other parts of the zone, consisting of different elements of the population in proportion to their numeric importance and which would be under the command of Entente officers. Also in administrative affairs the principle of numeric proportion was to be applied. This zone was to have a Christian Vali, who would be ap pointed by the League of Nations and assisted by a committee and a consulting corporation to be elected.

The Vilayet was to pay a tribute to Turkey increasing in the same measure as the revenues.

This agreement was to be in force for five years and could be modified after the expiration of this space of time by the League of Nations on the demand of one of the two parties.

Proposal of March, 1922: This contained a very far-reaching promise to the effect that the whole of Anatolia, and consequently also Smyrna, should be retroceded to us. The Entente Powers were to come to an understanding with Turkey and Greece for the intro duction of an administrative system securing in a just manner parti- cipation in the administration to the Greeks at Smyrna under the condition that the same right was granted to the Turks of Adrianople who would remain in Greece.

At Lausanne: Questions of this sort were naturally not even brought into discussion.

At Sevres: A frontier starting from the coast in the vicinity of Cape Kara Tish, and leaving rather to the south on Syrian territory Osmania, Baghtshe, Gazi Aintab, Biredshik, Urf ah, MardinandNissibin,

In March, 1922 : A special agreement had been signed with the French fixing a frontier which was approximately the same as it is to-day.

At Lausanne: The frontier fixed by the Angora agreement of 20 th October, 1921, is maintained.

(d) Irak frontier.

At Sevres: The northern frontier of the Vilayet of Mosul, Imadie, was to remain on our side.

Proposal of March, 1921: Not treated. Proposal of March, 1922: Not treated. At Lausanne: The solution of this question is set aside.

(e) Caucasus frontier.

At Sevres: The determination of the Turco-Armenian frontier is left to the care of Wilson, President of the United States. He indicates as frontier a line beginning east of Kerassund on the Black Sea, run ning west and south of Erzingan, south of Elmali, south of Bitlis and south of Lake Van, and following in many points the course of the river of the Turco-Russian frontier during the World War.

Proposals of March, 1921 : The League of Nations was to appoint a commission for determining the districts of the eastern Vilayets to be attributed to Armenia, for the purpose of constituting an Armenian homestead; Turkey was to accept the decision of this committee.

Proposals of March, 1922: It is stated therein that the help of the League of Nations was to be claimed for the creation of an Ar menian homestead.

At Lausanne: This question is postponed.

(f) Zone of the Straits.

At Sevres: This zone comprises the whole of the European territory remaining with Turkey.

In Asia Minor a district will have as boundary a line starting from the coast of the JBgean Sea approximately from the point where the

Kemal Pasha 39 6io

Smyrna district begins, running south of the Manias Lake, then somewhat north of Brusa and Isnik, through the southern part of the Sabandja Lake and ending at the mouth of the river Almbadr. ^

The right of keeping troops and undertaking military operations in this zone was to be given exclusively to the Allied Powers. The Turkish gendarmerie in this zone was likewise to be under the com mand of the Allied Powers.

The Allied Powers have the right to prohibit the construction of roads and railways in this zone which could be used for strategic purposes, and, in addition, to destroy those already in existence.

Proposals of March, 1922 : This zone comprises the district north of a line beginning at a point on the coast opposite the island of Tenedos, in the south of the Dardanelles and running to Kara Bigah; and, further, on the two sides of the Bosphorus to an extension of twenty to twenty-five kilometres.

It likewise comprises the islands which govern the Dardanelles on both sides.

The Allies were only to keep troops at GaUipoli, which^ would remain with Greece, and at Tshanak Kale, which would remain with Turkey; they would therefore evacuate Constantinople and the Ismidt peninsula, and allow Turkey to keep troops in Constantinople and to bring them from Anatolia to Europe and vice versa.

Proposals of March, 1922: The Sanjak of Tshanak Kale, without the peninsula of Artaki, south of the Dardanelles, the territory south of the Bosphorus, which was regarded then as neutral; that is to say, approximately the Ismidt peninsula as well as the islands to which we have referred, were to form the demilitarised zone. No allied troops of occupation were to remain in Turkey any longer.

At Lausanne: The peninsula of Gallipoli, the territory south-east of the line of Kum Baghi as far as Bakla Burnu; a strip of twenty kilometres in width, in the zone of Tshanak Kale counted from the shore; a strip of fifteen kilometres on both sides of the Bosphorus, the islands of the Sea of Marmora, except the islands of Emir Ali and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, will be demilitarised.

No troops of the Allied Powers to remain anywhere.

II. KURDISTAN

II. KURDISTAN.

At Sevres: A commission formed by representatives of the Allied Powers would prepare a local autonomous administration for the district situated east of the Euphrates, between Armenia, the Irak and Syria.

If after the conclusion of the treaty the Kurdish population of this region should address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations, and had proved that the majority of the Kurds wished to be independent of Turkey, and if the Council should accept this demand, Turkey would have to renounce all her rights in the districts in question.

Proposals of March, 1921 : Taking the new situation into consider ation, the Allied Powers declare themselves willing to consider alter ations in the Sevres Treaty regarding this question under the con dition that we on our part would show ourselves inclined to favour the local autonomy and sufficiently protect the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Chaldean interests.

Proposals of March, 1922: Not treated.

At Lausanne: We naturally refused to discuss this question.

III. SPHERE OF ECONOMIC INFLUENCE

III. SPHERE OF ECONOMIC INFLUENCE.

In the three-partition Treaty which the Entente Powers had signed following the Sevres Treaty there was comprised:

(a) In the French sphere of influence the district between the Syrian frontier on the one hand and a line which followed approx imately the western and northern frontiers of the Vilayet of Adana north of Kaissaria, and ran north of Sivas, approaching Musch and remaining on this side of the town, and from there towards Djesire ibn Omer on the other.

(b) In the Italian sphere of influence the district between a line following the Anatolian railway from the Ismidt peninsula to Afium Kara Hissar, running from there to the Erdjas Dagh in the district of Kaissaria on the one side and along the frontiers of the Smyrna district towards the JUgean Sea, the Mediterranean and the frontiers of the French sphere on the other.

March, 1921: According to the agreements signed between Bekir Sami Bey and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of France and Italy, which were later on rejected by the Government, these should com prise :

(a) The French sphere of influence, the districts which were at this time occupied by the French, as well as the Vilayets of Sivas, Maarumet ul Aziz and Diarbekr.

(b) The Italian sphere of influence, the Sanjaks of Adalia, Burdur, Mughla, Sparta as well as certain parts of the Sanjak of Afium Kara Hissar, Kutachia, Aidin and Konia to be determined later on.

Proposals of March, 1922: Not treated.

39* 6l2

IV. CONSTANTINOPLE

IV. CONSTANTINOPLE.

At Sevres: Constantinople was also to be taken from us if the treaty was not carried out quite honestly.

Proposals of March, 1921 : It is mentioned here that this threat would be eliminated, that Turkey could maintain troops in Con stantinople and that the march of troops through the demilitarised zone on both sides of the Bosphorus would be permitted.

Proposals of March, 1922 : It is promised to remove the threat of our expulsion from Constantinople and to increase the strength of the Turkish troops which are allowed to be in this town.

At Lausanne: Nothing is mentioned about all this.

V. NATIONALITY.

At Sevres: The Turkish Government ought to pledge themselves not to put any hindrance in the way of those Turkish subjects who were desirous of adopting the nationality of any of the Allied Powers, including Greece, or one of the newly-formed states, Armenia and others, and to recognise the new nationality of those persons.

Proposals of March, 1921: Not treated.

Proposals of March, 1922: Not treated.

Lausanne Treaty: This question is not mentioned here either; but the Entente Powers had during the course of negotiations de manded that for the settlement of nationality the documents and papers delivered by foreign embassies and consulates in Turkey should be regarded as sufficient. This proposal was nothing more than a new form of Article 128 of the Sevres Treaty, the contents of which have already been given. It was naturally rejected by us.

VI JUDICIAL CAPITULATIONS.

At Sevres: A commission consisting of four, representing England, France, Italy and Japan, in co-operation with experts of other states who beiiefitted by capitulations, were to work out a new system and recommend its adoption after having consulted the Ottoman Government about it.

The Ottoman Government had to pledge itself in advance to adopt this system.

Proposals of March, 1921: The Entente Powers agree that Turkey also should be represented on this commission.

Proposals of March, 1922: The same concession.

At Lausanne: No clause regarding capitulations.

We agree that some foreign experts should be engaged for five years as advisers. 6i3

VII. PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

VII. PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

Besides the stipulations contained in all treaties concluded after the Armistice of 1918 the following obligations were to be specially imposed on Turkey:

(a) To re-integrate all non-Turks who had left their abodes under the co-operation of a commission of arbitration, the presidents of which would be appointed by the League of Nations; to reinstate in their rights all non-Turks, and in case this commission should demand it to procure workmen, whose salaries had to be paid by the Govern ment, for the purpose of restoring the property of the persons if it should have been destroyed; to banish all those who had been accused by these commissions of having participated in deportations or similar measures, etc.

(b) The Turkish Government was to submit to the Entente Powers within two years the draft of an electoral law securing a proportional representation of the minorities in Parliament.

All privileges of the Patriarchs and similar institutions were to be strengthened and augmented. The right of control which the Go vernment had hitherto still to a certain degree been exercising over schools, hospitals and other establishments administered by the in stitutions was to be abolished.

After consultation with the Council of the League of Nations, the Entente Powers were to determine the measures necessary to secure the carrying out of this decision.

Turkey was to pledge herself to accept any further measure under taken on this question.

Proposals of March, 1921: The question of minorities was not treated. It will be presumed from this that the part of the Sevres Treaty purporting alterations relating to minorities was not to be altered.

Proposals of March, 1922: It is mentioned in these that a number of measures regarding minorities in Turkey and Greece will be pro posed and that the League of Nations would appoint commissioners to watch over the strict application of these measures.

The character of these measures was not specified.

At Lausanne : Here such stipulations are to be found as they exist in all international treaties made after the World War, as we have adopted them in our national pact; they are only applicable to non- Mohamedans.

VIII. MILITARY STIPULATIOS.

At Sfevres: The armed forces of Turkey are not to exceed in number:

Imperial Guard 700

Gendarmerie 35>

Special troops for the reinforcement

of the Gendarmerie 15,000

Total 50,700 men.

In this number are included the staff, the scholars of military schools, and the recruits, as well as soldiers and officers appdinted for special services.

The special troops could have fifteen batteries of mountain-guns, but they were not allowed to have either field-guns nor heavy artillery. The country was to be divided into different zones, each of which was to have a “Legion of Gendarmerie.” The Gendarmerie was neither to have artillery nor technical equipment at its disposal. The reinforcements were not to be used outside their own zone. Among the officers of the Gendarmerie were to be foreign officers whose number was not to exceed 1,500.

Within the same territorial region foreign officers had to be of the same nationality. Although the number of these regions, which were to be determined later, was not mentioned, it can be concluded from some of the stipulations of the Treaty, and especially from the remark: “The strength of each legion must not surpass a quarter of the entire strength of the legions,” that there were to be at least four regions according to the plan of the Allied Powers.

In the same way as there was to be a region for each of the groups of English, French and Italian officers, they had perhaps thought of entrusting one also to Greece and, later on, even to Armenia.

The men of the special troops had each to receive wages and had to be engaged for twelve years. Obligatory military service was to be abolished.

The recruiting of men and officers for the legion of each zone was to be made from the population of the zone, and efforts were to be made as far as possible to allow the different elements to be repre sented in the legion. Our naval forces were not to exceed seven sloops and six torpedo-boats.

We were neither to possess aeroplanes nor dirigibles.

The Control Commissions of the Army, Navy and Aeronautics were to have the right of practising every kind of supervision in the country. The Military Commission was especially entrusted with settling the number of the Customs officials, police agents, keepers of forests and of similar officials which Turkey would have the right to retain; of seizing superfluous quantities of arms and ammunition; of marking the boundary lines of the zones; of distributing the gendarmerie and special troops for the reinforcement of the different regions; of con trolling the conditions of the use of these troops; of fixing the pro portion of foreign officers according to nationalities, of reorganising the new troops with the consent of the Government, etc.

Proposals of March, 1921 : The actual strength of the gendarmerie is increased by 45,000 and that of the special troops by 30,000.

The distribution of the gendarmerie was to be undertaken as the basis of an understanding between the Government and the Control Commission.

The proportion of officers and non-commissioned officers in the gendarmerie was to be increased. The number of foreign officers was to be decreased and they were to be distributed according to an agreement between the Government and the Control Commission. They probably had in view that there ought not to be officers only of the same nationality in each zone.

Proposal of March, 1922: The system of voluntary recruitment was maintained.

The actual strength of the gendarmerie was maintained with 45,000 men, that of the special troops was brought to 40,000 men; although the employment of foreign officers in the gendarmerie is recommended to Turkey, it is no longer made a condition.

At Lausanne: There is no longer any stipulation of this kind except the restrictions concerning the demilitarised zone in Thrace and the Straits. We even preserve the right of keeping 12,000 men in the demilitarised zone on both sides of the Bosphorus. We did not accept any control even for these zones.

IX. SANCTIONS

IX. SANCTIONS.

At S&vres: On demand of the Allied Powers, including Greece and those States which had received Turkish territory (from Turkey) (Armenia and others), Turkey was to surrender all persons who had committed actions contrary to the laws and customs of war and who had made themselves guilty of cruelties in Turkey and had been participating in deportations and other similar actions. These per sons were to be judged and punished by the courts-martial of those States who had demanded their handing over. 6i6

Proposals of March, 1921 : The Powers no longer mentioned this point. The fact, however, that in the exchange convention signed by Bekir Sami Bey with the English it is agreed to leave part of the Turks who were regarded as being guilty in the hands of the English whilst all English who were in our hands were to be released, is nothing but a milder form of the preceding sanctions contained in the draft of the Sevres Treaty.

Proposal of March, 1922: There is no question of this condition.

At Lausanne: The same.

X. FINANCIAL STIPULATIONS.

At Sevres: For the purpose of coming to the aid of Turkey the Allied Powers proposed to form a Financial Commission, consisting of English, French and Italian representatives, to which a Turkish commissioner (with a consulting voice) as an advisor should belong.

The attributions and privileges of this commission were the fol lowing:

(a) Every suitable measure was to be made so as to maintain and augment the resources of Turkey.

(b) The budget to be presented to the Turkish Parliament was to be submitted to the Finance Commission, and was to be brought before Parliament in the form approved by this Commission.

Modifications introduced by Parliament were to become effective only after the approval of this Commission.

(c) The Finance Commission was to superintend the carrying out of the budget as well as that of the financial laws and orders of Turkey, with the help of the Turkish Finance Inspection, which would be under the Finance Commission, and their members were only to be appointed with the consent of this Commission.

(d) With the consent of the Administrative Council of the Dette Publique*) and the Banque Ottomane, the circulation of money in Turkey should be regulated and the finances be put on a healthy basis.

(e) With the exception of those revenues which had been ceded to the Dette Publique, all means of Turkey were to be placed at the disposal of the Finance Commission, which should use them in the following manner:

Firstly, after the payment of the salaries and the current expenses of the Finance Commission as well as the normal costs for the Allied *) Administration of the Turkish State debts by foreign Powers, troops of occupation, which would be kept in territories remaining Turkish after the Treaty comes into force, there would be taken into consideration the costs of the Allied troops of occupation from the 13 th October, 1918, onwards, in the territories which have remained Turkish and the costs of the Allied troops of occupation in the terri tories which have been detached from Turkey in favour of another Power, which had borne these costs of the occupation.

Secondly, there would be taken into consideration the indemnity which Turkey would have to pay for the losses and damages which the subjects of the Allied Powers had suffered. It was only then that the needs of Turkey would be considered.

(f) The consent of the Finance Commission would be absolutely necessary for every concession granted to Turkey.

(g) In accordance with the Commission the system of direct col lection of certain revenues, through the present administration of the Dette Publique, would be extended as far as possible and come into use for the whole of Turkey.

The Customs administration to be placed under a General Director who will be appointed by the Finance Commission, to which he would be responsible and which could replace him, etc.

Proposals of March, 1921: The above-mentioned Finance Com mission should be placed formally under the presidency of the Turkish Minister of Finance. A Turkish member should belong to the Com mission, who would have the right of voting on all questions concern ing Turkish finances.

In questions concerning the financial interests of the Allies the Turkish delegate would only have a consulting voice. The Turkish Parliament should have the right of making amendments in the budget, which would be prepared by the Turkish Minister of Finance in accordance with the Finance Commission. But if these amend ments were of a nature that could disturb the equilibrium of the budget, the budget was to be sent back to the Finance Commission for the purpose of approval.

The right of granting concessions is restored to Turkey. The Minister of Finance, however, would have to examine, together with the Finance Commission, the contracts of the concession to decide whether they were favourable or unfavourable to the Turkish ex chequer, and would make his decisions together with them.

Proposal of March, 1922: The establishment of a Finance Com mission is abandoned. But the attempt will be made to reconcile the control believed necessary for the payment of pre-War debts and a 6i8

reasonable indemnity due to the Allied Powers with, the principle of Turkish sovereignty,

The administrative council of the Dette Publique will be main tained in the same way as it existed before the War, and the Allied Powers will institute a commission of liquidation for the purpose mentioned.

At Lausanne: All stipulations of this kind were abolished.

XI ECONOMIC STIPULATIONS (Clauses).

At Sevres: The system of the capitulations was to be restored in favour of the subjects of the Allied Powers who possessed these pri vileges before the War, and their enjoyment was to be extended to the subjects of those of the Allied Powers who did not possess them before (Greece, Armenia and others). (The importance of these stipulations will be better understood if the fact is taken into consideration that the exemption from many taxes belonged to these privileges, and that, as you have seen in the chapter about nationality, we were to be deprived of the right to prevent any Turkish subject from acquiring the nationality of one of the Allied Powers.)

For the Customs the tariff of 1907 (8 per cent, ad valorem) is reestablished.

Turkey gives at least the same rights to the ships of the Allied Powers as she grants to Turkish ships.

The foreign post offices are re-established.

Proposals of March, 1921 : It is only said here that the suppression of foreign posts would, under certain conditions, be considered; the other stipulations are therefore maintained.

Proposals of March, 1922: Within three months of the Peace Treaty coming into force a commission consisting of representatives of England, France, Italy, Japan and Turkey, as well as experts of other states possessing the rights of the capitulations, were to meet in Constantinople and draft proposals for the modification of the system of capitulations.

In the financial sphere these proposals intended to put foreign subjects on the same footing as the Turks, regarding the liability to pay taxes; they were also aimed at the realisation of the modifications believed to be necessary in the Customs rights.

At Lausanne: Capitulations of any description are completely and for ever abolished. XII. COMMISSION OF THE STRAITS.

At Sevres: This Commission, which was to have a special flag, a special Budget, and an organisation of police subject to them, was to deal with the passage of the ships through the Straits, the lighthouses, pilots, etc.; the functions formerly performed by the Superior Council of Health in Constantinople were to be in future under the control of this Commission and practised as they should dictate.

In case the Commission were of the opinion that the free traffic through the Straits was obstructed, they were to notify the Allied Powers of this fact.

The United States of America, England, France, Italy, Japan and Russia would each have two members on the Commission.

The United States of America, in case they so desired and dating from the day they wished it, and Russia, if she should become a member of the League of Nations, and from that day onward, would be able to participate in this Commission.

The members of the Commission would enjoy diplomatic privileges and diplomatic immunity. The delegates of those nations which could claim two votes would in turn and for two years have the presidency of the Commission.

Proposals of March, 1922 : The presidency of the Turkish delegates on the Commission would be maintained.

All states interested in the Straits were to be represented on the Commission.

At Lausanne: The presidency of the Commission is finally given to us.

The task of the Commission will be restricted to watching that the passage of ships through the Straits takes place in accordance with the stipulations of the convention ad hoc.

The Commission has to give a yearly report to the League of Nations.

Through the same treaty the International Council for Health in Constantinople is dissolved and the sanitary control is entrusted to the Turkish Government.

Gentlemen, I do not believe it necessary to continue with a com parison of the stipulations of the Lausanne Peace Treaty with the contents of the other Peace proposals.

The Treaty of Lausanne is the document which reveals in a decisive manner the failure of a vast plot which had been hatching for centuries against the Turkish nation, a plot which they believed they had carried to success through the Sevres Treaty.

Gentlemen, I wish to enlighten public opinion by speaking about a question which had arisen during the negotiations at Lausanne and about which rumours had been spread after the conclusion of peace.

The conflict which arose between Ismet Pasha, the leader of the Delegation, and Rauf Bey

This question concerns the conflict which arose between Ismet Pasha, the leader of the Delegation, and Rauf Bey, President of the Council of Ministers. Examining the documents relating to it, it appears to be difficult to explain this conflict by essential and serious reasons, and I am rather of the opinion that it must be regarded as an effect of motives of a psychological character.

I have repeatedly had the opportunity of saying that, speaking of the Lausanne Conference, a desire to entrust Rauf Bey with the leadership of the dele gation had become apparent. In fact Rauf Bey aimed at becoming President of the Turkish delegation at the Conference. He had even asked me to give him Ismet Pasha as military adviser. I replied that Ismet Pasha could only be employed if we were to send him as leader of the delegation.

As is known to you, by the way, we did not send Rauf Bey. Ismet Pasha was countermanded from the Army, and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the Delegation.

I have explained to you the attacks and criticisms to which Ismet Pasha was exposed after the first Conference of Lausanne. In spite of them, Ismet Pasha was sent for the second time to Lausanne. Ismet Pasha directed the negotiations with discrimination. He in formed the Council of Ministers regularly of the individual stages of the negotiations.

In certain important questions he asked the advice of the Council of Ministers, and demanded their instructions. The problems which had to be solved were especially serious ; the fight was difficult and exhausting.

Dissatisfaction with the way and manner in which Ismet Pasha managed the negotiations became apparent to Rauf Bey. He en deavoured to instil the same feeling also into his colleagues in the Cabinet. When the reports of Ismet Pasha were read in the Council of Ministers, the opinion was from time to time expressed that Ismet Pasha would not reach the aim of his task. At a certain moment even the question arose of putting forward a motion for Ismet Pasha s recall. Rauf Bey was said to have tried to bring it to the vote; but through the intervention of Kiasim Pasha, who was a member of the Cabinet in his capacity of Minister for National Defence, this idea was apparently abandoned.

The same feeling of distrust arose in the mind of Ismet Pasha against Rauf Bey, President of the Council of Ministers. He began to look with suspicion at communications which he received with the signature of Rauf Bey, believing that he gave him instructions with out my knowledge.

Finally, in a letter to me, Ismet Pasha pointed out that the negotiations had entered into a serious and critical stage, and he asked me personally to follow the course of the debates.

It is true that I was kept well posted up regarding the reports of Ismet Pasha and the decisions of the Council of Ministers; but I did not control the script in which Rauf Bey transmitted the decisions. After Ismet Pasha had attracted my attention I felt the necessity of personally following the negotiations of Lausanne in the Council of Ministers and sometimes even to compose the decisions of the Council of Ministers.

So as to give you a clear and precise idea of the question of which we are speaking, I shall examine in your presence the correspondence concerning one or two questions of the different problems which were discussed in the letters exchanged between Ismet Pasha and Rauf Bey.

Greece had adopted an unyielding attitude on the Reparations question. The negotiations regarding this question between Ismet Pasha and Venizelos had been broken off. The delegates of the Allied Powers proposed to Ismet Pasha to settle this question by leaving us Kara Agatch in exchange for our renouncing the idea of reparations.

Ismet Pasha declared that Kara Agatch could not be a compen sation for the equitable reparations we demanded, and that, on the other hand, the reparations question, which was settled at an earlier date between us and the Allies, not having been resumed and confirmed in this Conference, he saw himself obliged to submit the two questions simultaneously to his Government.

Ismet Pasha actually informed the President of the Council of Ministers of this situation in a telegram in cipher dated the ig ilL May, 1923, and requested the “speedy transmission of the decision of the Government on this question.”

Three days passed without Ismet Pasha getting a reply to this ommunication. On. the 22 nd May he sent the following telegram marked urgent to the President of the Council of Ministers: “In my telegram of the ig ilL May, 1923, No. 118, I had requested to be informed of the point of view of the Government on the question concerning the proposal made by the Allies, to the effect that Kara Agatch and surroundings would be ceded to Turkey for the renun ciation of Greek reparations. I ask Your Excellency urgently to hasten on these instructions.”

Rauf Bey answered both these telegrams on the 23 rd May. The first paragraph of this reply ran as follows:

“We cannot renounce our claim for reparations against the cession of Kara Agatch” and after reflection he said in the third paragraph:

“It is strange and inadmissible that it should be the Allies who declare that the Greeks cannot pay the amount of the reparations.”

After some further observations, you find the following point of view in the fifth paragraph:

“So that the question of the conclusion of Peace with the Allies should not be impeded, it is preferable that they should conclude the peace with us and leave it to us to come to an agreement with the Greeks on this question.”

Ismet Pasha on the 24 th May, 1923, addressed four reports successively one after the other to Rauf Bey, in which he informed him among other things of the following:

1. To-day General Pelle came to see me. He has informed me that the Greek Delegation had proposed to place the reparations question officially on the order of the day within two days, that is to say, on Saturday, and had declared that they would leave the Con ference on the same day unless our answer to this question was received.

“Up to this moment I have not received a reply from you with regard to the reparations. I have contented myself to tell him that nothing can be done until I had got a reply from my Government, and that I had not been especially moved by this communication. I am convinced that we have entered the last stage of our negotiations. The rumours spread in public and the newspapers are in general pessimistic.”

2. “I have received Your Excellency s reply to different questions. It is remarkable that the negative answer to Angora on the repara tions question has been known here before I received it. It is im possible that an indiscretion has taken place in the circles here; for nobody knows yet the proposals that were made nor the answer we received …”

Ismet Pasha expressed his idea on the affair of the Greek repara tions as follows: “It appears necessary to me to clear up this affair of the Greek reparations by accepting the offer of Kara Agatch and surroundings.

” It is said to be impossible for the Allies to make the Greeks pay. Even if we should be sure of winning the war, thanks to the neutrality of all the Allies, it would mean for us to go into a cul-de-sac if we should insist on the principle of payment when there is no means of coercion really to get the possession of the money.

“Similar attempts have been made in all countries . . .”

Ismet Pasha explained his point of view in observations which were as sensible as they were perspicacious, and added:

“According to the present situation of the Conference the economic and industrial questions, as well as those of the rights of abode and all other questions, have been solved favourably or are on the way to being solved favourably by an absolute majority . . ,”

“The evacuation has not yet been settled; but there is reason to hope that it will be settled according to our wishes, which, by the way, is an essential condition for us.”

In addition, he spoke of the results he had attained, or which he believed to be able to attain, on the other questions, and he con tinued :

“I have come to the conclusion that the hope of concluding peace is a very strong one, if the Government sticks to the essential points of our instructions, and if the Greek reparations are settled in the manner I have proposed. But if the Government wants to risk a rupture on the question of the Greek reparations, and if they con tinue to uphold fixed ideas regarding the discussions about the points which are not contained in our instructions the signing of the Peace Treaty will be endangered.

“We upheld the principle that the foreign coasting-trade should be unrestrictedly anid unconditionally done away with or that the question should be set aside till after the conclusion of Peace; but we have found that the only way for the settlement of the question would be to conclude a special convention of two years validity under certain conditions. Send us, with regard to this question, too, unalterable articles.

“In short,” said Ismet Pasha, “my last opinion in a comprised form is this:

“We are on the way to working out a Peace Treaty containing the maximum of conditions favourable to our interests which we can possibly obtain. If the Government insists in their belief that it is possible to attain more considerable advantages regarding the Greek reparations or other questions, and if they want to face a rupture for this reason, I on my part do not share this conviction. I ask the Chief of the State himself to give me immediate explanations about this point. If there is no accord between our views, it is my duty to return home, leaving the delegation here, and after having verbally explained the situation to the Council of Ministers to put a limit to my respon sibility for war or peace.”

The last sentence of the telegram of Ismet Pasha read as follows:

“I ask you to bring my explanations in this form to the knowledge of the President of the Grand National Assembly.”

That is to say to my knowledge.

To summarise the communications which I have just given you, we can conclude the following:

Ismet Pasha believed that the question of the Greek reparations had to be solved by the regaining of Kara Agatch; he was convinced that the Treaty which was in preparation contained the maximum of favourable conditions which we could obtain. Rauf Bey, on the other hand, said that we could not abandon our claim for the amount of the reparations against the cession of Kara Agatch.

After having read the whole of the correspondence between Rauf Bey and Ismet Pasha, I joined in the main points the view of Ismet Pasha.

But both Rauf Bey and Ismet Pasha were very obstinate in their opinions

But both Rauf Bey and Ismet Pasha were very obstinate in their opinions, and had both used very energetic language in expressing them. Rauf Bey found himself in a sphere of propaganda where it was easy for him to shine in the eyes of the Assembly and of public opinion. He defended the following thesis:

“After the brilliant victory we cannot abandon our claim for reparations from the Greeks who have devastated our country. Might the Entente Powers leave us alone and unimpeded facing the Greeks. We shall regulate our accounts with them.”

Ismet Pasha, regarding the question of peace to its full extent and aiming at its realisation on its great lines, found himself during these days of conflict with the President of the Council of Ministers forced into a situation in which he had to propose sacrifices with regard to the Greeks. It was naturally not very easy to explain to the public the justness of this point of view, and the necessity of its acceptance.

The problem had to be solved in such a manner that the con clusion of peace would be secured through the acceptance of Ismet Pasha s proposal, and that, at the same time, Rauf Bey and the Cabinet whose President he was would remain in office and continue to work till the conclusion of peace!

The attitude which I assumed in general towards both of the par ties was nothing less than amiable. I made use of the system of agreeing with one party and imposing silence on the other.

So as to explain to you how I faced the situation and in what form I settled my point of view, I shall submit to you verbally the text of the communication which was addressed to Ismet Pasha after the sitting of the Council of Ministers on the 25 th May, 1923.

Two telegrams in cipher were sent to Ismet Pasha. The one con taining the decision of the Council of Ministers bore the signature of Rauf Bey; it was dictated by me to Kiasim Pasha.

The second one was written and signed by me personally.

The telegram with the signature of Rauf Bey read as follows:

25 th May, 1923. To His Excellency Ismet Pasha.

In the following we explain to you the decision arrived at by the Council of Ministers who met under the presidency of His Excellency the Ghazi Pasha, following your telegrams No. 141 and 144 of the 24 th May.

We regard as a whole the essential questions and those in sus pense which are impeding the conclusion of peace. If every time when one of these questions is taking an unfavourable turn we are to be asked to offer sacrifices, and if we recognise the necessity of agreeing, we shall promote the possibility that one after the other of the questions in suspense will be solved likewise to our disadvantage.

In case we should offer sacrifices on the question of the Greek reparations, these sacrifices should at least serve the cause of peace by promoting in our favour the solution of the other questions in suspense to which a favourable decision is absolutely necessary. Con sequently, we must not decide to offer such sacrifices unless the obligation is undertaken of connecting the Greek reparations and treating conjointly with it the questions of the interests of the Dette Publique, of the speedy evacuation, of the judicial formula and the indemnities of the Societies and of giving them a solution satis factory to us.

Convinced that it will be possible to attain a peace which secures a maximum of advantages by this method, and that long negotiations undertaken under other conditions could not bring us a happy peace, the Council of Ministers ask you to present to the

Kemal Pasha 4 Conference proposals in the ultimate and categoric form we have indicated and to await their reply. Hussein Rauf.

The telegram which I wrote myself, on the other hand, read as follows :

May 25 th , 1923.

To His Excellency Ismet Pasha.

The contents of your telegrams of the 24 th May, No. 141 and

144, have been examined and discussed by us together with the

Council of Ministers. The decision which has been arrived at has been communicated to you by the President of the Council of Ministers.

My own observations regarding it are as follows:

1. The point on which we must be persistent and obstinate is not the question of sacrifices which Turkey offers in respect of the Greek reparations, but rather the fact that before consenting to these sacrifices, we have not been able to see yet a settlement of the other important and essential questions which are in the way of the con clusion of peace, and that we have no convincing proofs yet that they will be settled according to our hopes.

The economic questions, which it is supposed are solved or can be solved, are actually depending on the result of the negotiations which will take place with the Societies whose representatives continue to remain assembled at Angora. We have, however, already been able to observe that these Societies are putting forth exaggerated claims*).

2. It is seriously feared that the Entente Powers want to post pone the evacuation of Constantinople until the economic and finan cial questions are regulated according to their views, that is to say, to our disadvantage. The assumption that this postponement could last until the Mosul question has been decided in favour of Eng land is even very much substantiated.

3. It seems also that the question of the interruption in the pay ment of our debts cannot be solved in our favour as long as they insist on the claim for a declaration concerning the maintenance of the Muharrem Decree **).

4. It must also be remarked that in spite of our acceptance of the judicial formula as proposed by the Allies, they have later on retracted and insisted on this question.

*) This refers to the question of foreign societies which raised claims based on concessions made to them by the former Turkish Government.

**) That is to say, the continuation of the Dette Publique, which had been established through the so-called Muharrem Decree of 1881. 5. Consequently I explain the reason through which they are trying to force us to bring the sacrifices in the Greek reparations question as follows:

The Greeks do not wish to keep their armies too long under arms, and exhaust them thereby. They are therefore forced to secure a safe and quiet situation by producing a settlement on the reparations question, which is still in suspense between them and the Turks, according to their wishes.

With regard to the Entente Powers they have not the firm in tention of solving the questions which we consider to be vital in our favour, but to draw out the negotiations as long as possible for the purpose of tiring us over every point and finally to force us to make sacrifices in their favour. And on the other hand, not being inclined to permit the Greeks to take up arms for securing a satisfactory solution, they want to satisfy them and secure a quiet situation for them by producing the acceptance of their desire through pressure on us.

I do not believe that we serve the cause, of peace by consenting to make sacrifices in answer to this pressure.

On the contrary, still more time will pass and we shall finally see ourselves forced to make more and more sacrifices for the restor ation of peace. Nine months have gone by since the re-conquest of Smyrna. Nine further months may pass in the same way.

It must seriously be considered that we cannot consent to remain indefinitely in this uncertainty.

6. It would bring us into a difficult situation and weaken us if we were to consent to make sacrifices which are to our disadvantage without at the same time securing the settlement of those questions, the solution of which in our favour is indispensable.

The moment has also come for regarding the questions which must serve as a basis for the Peace Treaty as a whole; of proposing this to the Conference in an explicit and categorical manner and of absolutely abstaining from any consent to a final solution of those questions which involve any sacrifice until we have received assurances in this regard.

7. I beg you not to hasten the execution of your conclusion which is expressed in your telegram of the 24 th May, No. 144.

Do not insist too much on the necessity of sacrifices as we have not yet been able to obtain in a sure and complete manner the re cognition of our vital rights and our independence on financial, economic, judicial and administrative questions, which form vital points of the instructions emanating originally from Parliament.

8. As long as the Entente Powers have not absolutely decided to impose unfavourable conditions on us on the questions concerning our existence and our independence, they will not permit the Greek army to proceed to action because we have assumed a decisive attitude on the reparations question, nor will they give their consent to entering en bloc and effectively into war against us.

If their decision to maintain a hostile point of view is final, it will not be on account of the Greek reparations question alone, but also on account of questions concerning the whole world, such as the evacua tion of Constantinople or the interruption of the service of the interest on loans or judicial affairs, that these Powers will proceed to action against us under conditions that are much more favourable to them.

The only difference would be that our position would become still weaker thereby.

9. It is not in our interest to accept the demands of the Greeks, in order to prevent them leaving the Conference on Saturday; their departure would be of no importance and have no effect if it were not followed by the departure of the Entente Powers. If, by an nouncing their departure from the Conference, the Greeks mean that they will actually enter upon military operations there would surely be points in this regard upon which we should be justified in appealing to the Allied Powers.

10. In short, face to face with the rapid and unexpected threat, the acceptance of a sacrifice on an individual question seems to us to be rather an impediment to a speedy peace. I repeat : Request the the Allied Powers for a settlement of the essential questions.

Mustapha Kemal.

Independently from the above I sent the following telegram in cipher to Ismet Pasha, marked “Personal”:

“In cipher: Personal. 25 th May, 1923.

To His Excellency Ismet Pasha.

I consider it to be necessary to consider and examine once again the whole of the correspondence between the President of the Council of Ministers and the delegation. I understand from the tone of some of the telegrams that some misunderstandings are existing between the two parties. There is no obstinacy on the question of the accept ance or rejection of the reparations. For the purpose of explaining this to you I have told you my opinion about the situation and my points of view in a separate telegram.

Impatiently waiting to see you again, my dear brother, I em brace you cordially.

Mustapha Kemal.

From the contents of these telegrams it became clearly evident that in principle we were willing to abandon our claims for reparations for the cession of Kara Agatch.

We drew Ismet Pasha s attention, however, to the necessity of securing on the essential questions a favourable solution of those points which we regarded as being specially important and in need of settlement. This was in fact also the sense and the intention which Ismet Pasha himself derived from these communications.

On the 24^ May, 1923, the same day on which he asked Rauf Bey to bring his observations verbatim to my knowledge, he also addressed a telegram direct to me.

I received this telegram, which was sent off on the 24** May, on the 26 th . It had arrived in the key for Foreign Affairs, and was handed to me after Rauf Bey had read it. The contents of this telegram contained a sort of complaint against Rauf Bey.

This telegram of Ismet Pasha read as follows:

No. 145. Lausanne. Transmitted on the 24 th May, 1923.

Arrived on the 26 th .

To His Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha. I have sent a detailed report about the situation to the President of the Council of Ministers.

There is a fundamental difference of opinion between the Govern ment and myself. In case that no understanding is reached, I should be forced to return and I have decided to do so.

I have explicitly demanded that my report shall be communicatedto you, the President of the Assembly. The sitting of the Conferenceapproaches its end and the situation does not allow of any delay.

According to my conviction, peace can be secured within thecompass of the suggestions which I have expressed.

Under these extraordinary conditions I beg Your Excellency closely to follow the general situation. (Signed) Ismet.

26 th May, 1923.

This telegram arrived one day later than the other telegrams to be submitted to His Excellency the Ghazi-Pasha.

(Signed) Hussein Rauf. On the same day I sent the following reply to Ismet Pasha: In cipher at the instrument. Angora, 26 th May, 1923.

To His Excellency Ismet Pasha.

I received your telegram in cipher, No. 145, dated the 24 th May, on the 26 tlx May.

I have already sent two telegrams, a short one and a more detailed one. The motive of your resolution to return being the question of a sacrifice on the reparations question, I cannot approve of it.

I believe that you will reach a more favourable stage if you con tinue to work within the compass of my suggestions. The difference of opinion between the Council of Ministers and yourself of which you speak, will then be dissipated. I embrace you.

Ghazi Mustapha Kemal.

In reports which Ismet Pasha sent to the President of the Council of Ministers on the 26 th May, 1923, he declared to have acted in accord ance with the communications of the President of the Council of Ministers, with the contents of my telegrams and with the essential instructions given to the delegation, and informed me that on the afternoon of the 26 th May he had accepted the proposal of the Allied Delegates with regard to the restitution of Kara Agatch as part of the Greek reparations and that he hoped to arrive at a solution of the other questions within a few days.

Rauf Bey transmitted these reports to me on the 27 th May, adding the following:

Nos. 154/155. 27 th May, 1923.

To the High President of the Grand National Assembly

of Turkey.

I have the honour of sending to Your Excellency herewith a copy of the telegram of the 26th May sent by His Excellency Ismet Pasha.

(Signed) Hussein Rauf, Temporary Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On the same day Rauf Bey sent the following communication to Ismet Pasha:

27 th May, 1923.

To His Excellency Ismet Pasha. Reply to your telegram No. 151 of the 26 th May. We have found that the attitude of the delegation on the question of the Greek reparations is in clear contradiction to the instructions of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers having been placed thereby in a difficult position will, in view of the interests of the nation, not alter their attitude or view towards you in the expectation that according to your declarations the solution of the important questions will, as expected, take place in three or four days. It is naturally well understood that there can be no further question of sacrifice on the other essential points mentioned in the preceding telegram. (Signed) Hussein Rauf.

After having noted Ismet Pasha s reports regarding the renun ciation of reparations towards the restitution of Kara Agatch, I sent him the following telegram analysing the communication of the 25 th May, which was signed by Rauf Bey:

27 th May, 1923. To His Excellency Ismet Pasha.

The decision of the Council of Ministers contained three essential points :

1. The sacrifices to which we are to consent in the reparations question must in return bring the favourable solution of the im portant questions which are still in suspense;

2. The four questions concerning the interests of the Dette Pub- lique, the speedy evacuation, the judicial formula and the indemni fication of the societies must be raised simultaneously with the pro blem of the reparations; that is to say, the acceptance of twelve million Turkish pounds by all societies, whoever their shareholders might be, or whatever their nationality, without referring any more to further indemnities. Unless these four questions are settled in our favour, we cannot consent to the sacrifice of the reparations.

3. These proposals must be brought before the Conference in final and decisive form and the reply awaited.

The points in which the delegation have deviated from the con siderations and observations of the Council of Ministers in their con ception and actions are the following:

1. The delegation have considered as a whole only the essential questions in suspense and have excluded the reparations question.

2. It is not considered advantageous that a rupture should take place through the departure of the Greek Delegation from the Con ference, and that the Mudania Convention should be broken through an offensive of the Greek army, and, on the other hand, it has been thought to be desirable that in case no agreement should be reached on the other questions the rupture should come from our side. This is a point which deserves consideration.

3. The principle of a sacrifice on the reparations question being accepted, it is important to receive in return the solution of the other questions within a few days. On this point the Council of Ministers have not yet made up their minds. If actual success should be reached in our favour concerning the important questions within three or four days, the doubts which were believed to be the necessary result of the reparations question being given the precedency would be removed. Your Excellency, however, declares that after the solution of the ques tions which you are regarding hopefully, the affair of the confirmation of the Muharrem Decree preserves its fundamental importance.

4. You point out that an interruption of the Conference on ac count of the coupons*) would strengthen our situation in the interior as well as towards foreign countries.

This must also be taken into consideration. On this question all foreign countries are hostile to us ; to explain this to the people is not so easy as that of the reparations affair.

On the reparations question, too, there are reasons that publicity in foreign countries should acknowledge our right.

5. A rupture coming from our side on the essential questions would correspond with the wishes of the Allies if an immediate action did not follow it.

An idea would also be created that if a rupture must be produced for this reason the fact that it was provoked by an attack of the Greeks would be of a nature to justify our attitude.

6. In short, the points of the divergence of opinion between the Council of Ministers and the Delegation are important. The Council of Ministers was afraid of being put before accomplished facts.

For this reason it is necessary to show that the doubts which were raised if the reparations question were given precedence will be removed by laying the greatest stress on the solution of the essential questions within three or four days, as you have indicated.

It therefore depends entirely on your seriously declaring at once to the competent places that we shall consent to make this sacrifice if the questions in suspense are quickly solved in our favour; and if, after all, a rupture should take place, you will have to proceed in a manner showing that it is caused in a sphere in which the Allies are in the position of both provoker and attacker.

*) The Turkish pre-War debts and the question of their paying interest. 7. Will you inform us of the smallest modifications which take place in the situation during the next few days, and especially of the state of mind which the Allies show after our consenting to the sacrifice?

The new hopes which may be raised in the Allies after the success which they have achieved by threatening us are feared for good reasons. (Signed) Mustapha Kemal.

In a telegram of the 28 th May to Rauf Bey Ismet Pasha said:

A difference as to the procedure had arisen between us, that is to say, whether precedence is to be given to this or that question, a fact which does not concern the essence of the directive lines but the way of their application.

The reparations question has not yet received definite confirm ation; the other main questions will be discussed successively; it is believed that the Conference will take up a definite position on all questions on Friday or Saturday.

I told you that we had consented to the sacrifice on the repara tions question on condition that the financial and economic questions which concern us should be taken into consideration.

Consequently, unless an agreement is reached on other questions, the question of the Greek reparations will be brought forward again for general decision.

If you should find that, although we have respected your instruc tions on the essential points, we do not completely and verbally follow your sudden orders, your categoric lines of conduct and the formal directions which you give us with regard to the treatment of different questions, you must know that this does not happen for lack of goodwill but because it is practically impossible for us to do so.

With regard to myself, I had noticed the difference of our points of view from the beginning, and I had asked you quite openly to express this fact.

Nothing has been signed yet; no obligation has been entered upon.

If our way of procedure seems to raise doubts in you it is still possible to rectify it according to your own point of view.

In short, 95 per cent, of the Peace question is solved. The diffi culties are smoothed and limited for the person who will assume this task after me.

On the other hand, if it should not be given to us to conclude the Peace and if a rupture should take place, the attitude adopted by us will not give to the latter a form more unfavourable to us. It is your task and that of the Council of Ministers to make the necessary decisions in every way.

On the same day Ismet Pasha also replied to me as follows:

Lausanne. Sent off 28 th May, 1923.

Received 29 th May, 1923.

To the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. For His Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

The situation can be judged from my report to the Council of Ministers. We shall discuss the main questions during the next few days, at the rate of one question a day.

We shall naturally constantly use the question of the Greek repara tions as an argument for the solution of all questions in suspense. We have reserved this possibility to ourselves.

The settlement of the Greek reparations question has not raised the hope that a satisfactory solution of other questions can be at tained by threatening us.

On the contrary, the possibility of threats has been removed. The situation has become much calmer again. If it should sooner or later come to a rupture, the Greek army will either not march because they have no special reason for it, or we shall prove that they are marching with the others and on their account.

Both these eventualities appear to us more advantageous, morally and materially, than that the Greek troops should open a campaign under the pretext of reparations.

There is no reason to fear that the Council of Ministers will have to face a fait accompli.

Our procedure can at the utmost lead to differences with regard to the form which is due to our way of contemplating the situation as a whole.

Nevertheless I had also anticipated this to you. I have the honour of informing you that within a few days one will be able to judge the essential questions as a whole. Ismet

I gave the following reply to Ismet Pasha:

In cipher. Urgent. 29^ May, 1923.

To His Excellency Ismet Pasha.

I consider Your Excellency s communication, that the Peace questions have to a great extent already been solved, as being very gratifying. If according to your statements the situation is cleared within a few days we shall be reassured. I wish you success. His Excellency Fewsi Pasha is also at Angora. He will remain here till the situation has improved.

I embrace you. Mustapha KemaL

After Ismet Pasha had received my telegram he continued his endeavours. I prevented Rauf Bey- and the Council of Ministers from showing any further obstinacy in the matter.

For a month it seemed as if both parties would preserve their stolidity. During this time Ismet Pasha asked the President of the Council of Ministers for his opinion on different questions.

A correspondence on the question of the coupons and the con cessions again raised frest irritation on both sides.

In the reply which Ismet Pasha gave on the 26 tlx June to a com munication of Rauf Bey, the following sentences are to be found:

“We shall not touch the solution of the question of the concessions before the question of the coupons is settled. Besides, the question which we put was intended to ask for instructions regarding the atti tude which we should assume after the settlement of the question of the coupons. The Government passes over this question in silence.

“If in the course of the negotiations all steps of the Delegation up to their minutest details and beyond the obligations imposed upon us by the fundamental instructions were to be directed from Angora itself, that would mean depriving the Delegation of the possibility of directing the negotiations in a manner most advantageous to the country and which would bring us nearer to the conclusion of peace.

“This procedure, which the Government prefers, does not differ from the manner in which the campaign of 1877 was directed from the Palace.

“As long as distrust and the conviction of our incapability which is constantly expressed lasts, the possibility of concluding peace through our mediation is out of the question.

“We ask, therefore, that a Delegation which is convinced that it can move the Allies to accept the views of the Government in their present form and to which, naturally, Your Excellency and on account of his office the Minister of Finance should belong, will take the reponsibility upon themselves and come to the Conference.”

The Minister of Finance was Hassan Fehmi Bey. I was informed of this telegram. I prevented Rauf Bey giving a reply to it and wrote the following to Ismet Pasha: Personal. 26 tn June, 1923.

To His Excellency Ismet Pasha.

I have read your telegraphic reply of June 26 th , 1923. It must have been written in a moment of special irritation. There is no feeling, no idea, no action which could have been spoken in support of it. I find that you are in the wrong.

We are well aware of the difficulties and impediments which you have to face. It is possible that they will even increase in future.

Those who provoke these differences are the people not of Angora, but down there who daily prepare new intrigues. You must bring your task with firmness and great stolidity to a happy issue. I do not see anything that could provoke a misunderstanding. The field of your activity is not limited; but the compass of your work being circumscribed and confined to the most important ques tions the atmosphere which you breathe is naturally oppressive.

I embrace you. Ghazi Mustapha Kemal.

You see, Gentlemen, that in my correspondence with Ismet Pasha it occurred that I had used expressions which could hurt him.

Up to the end I sent him communications of this kind in severe language. There are also communications of Ismet Pasha to me which are made in the same tone.

Each time the necessity arose I told Ismet Pasha that the deci sions of the Council of Ministers represented also my views.

Consequently some of the complaints which Ismet Pasha addressed to the President of the Council could not be regarded as exclusively relating to Rauf Bey. They concerned all Ministers and extended also to my own person.

I do not believe it justified Rauf Bey in regarding this conflict of opinion as a purely personal question between himself and Ismet Pasha, though he tried to propagate this idea.

In every situation and on every question a conflict of opinion can arise between he who gives instructions and he who carries them through from a far distance, especially under conditions which are unknown to the person from whom they emanate. In such cases one must act according to the exigencies of the situation at the moment under the conditions that the essential aim is maintained.

The fact that Ismet Pasha believed it necessary to ask me to follow the course of events was also excusable, for the question was both important and vital. At last, Gentlemen, the Conference came to an end in the middle of July.

Before the signing of the Peace Treaty, Ismet Pasha had in formed Rauf Bey, the President of the Council, that the Conference was at an end, and also of the way the question had been solved.

Rauf Bey had not given a reply, neither positive nor negative. Apparently Ismet Pasha suffered much during these days of ex pectation and anxiety. He attributed the silence of the Government to indecision at Angora.

Three days after he had written to Rauf Bey, on the iS 111 July, he informed me of the affair. In this telegram he numbered and ex plained the points one after the other, on which, according to his view, the Government could hesitate, and concluded:

“If the Government has decided radically to reject all that we have accepted, it will not be ourselves who can undertake this.

The only way which I have been able to find, after long con sideration, would be to give corresponding notice to the High Com missioners in Constantinople, and to withdraw from the signing of the commission. It is true that this would be a scandal on our part unprecedented in the world; but the great interests of our country stand above personal considerations and the National Government must carry out their convictions.

“We expect no thanks from the Government. It will be to the nation and to history that we shall submit the result of our en deavours.”

It is superfluous to explain how remarkable the work was which Ismet Pasha had accomplished. It is natural that he should have expected a speedy reply to a communication which indicated that the work was accomplished and that the last day, that of the signa ture, had arrived.

Communication between Angora and Lausanne could be secured within a day or, at the utmost, two days. The simplest explanation of the fact that no answer had arrived after three days was appar ently presumed to be that the Council of Ministers had regarded the matter with negligence and indifference.

One could even believe that the work accomplished was regarded as being imperfect by the Government, that they wanted to de nounce it, and that it was on account of the uncertainty prevailing on this subject that they were not in a position to give an answer.

If in this case we take into consideration the fact that the person, for the purpose of bringing his task to an end, had to take upon himself before history the difficult responsibility of signing, and had to place himself in the most delicate situation, we must admit that Ismet Pasha had every reason to be hurt and distressed.

I sent immediately the following reply to Ismet Pasha s telegram :

Angora, 19 *& July, 1923. To His Excellency Ismet Pasha.

I have received your telegram of the 18 th July inst. There is no uncertainty with anybody. We expect that the signing shall take place as usual in order to address to you our most sincere and warmest congratulations for the success which you have achieved.

(Signed) Ghazi Mustapha Kemal,

President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Commander-in-Chief.

Ismet Pasha replied to this telegram. I submit his reply ver batim to you, as it is a precious document, showing the degree of suffering which he had endured and at the same time his loyalty and, especially, his modesty:

No. 338. Lausanne, 2O th July, 1923.

To His Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha. As Deus ex machina you always intervene when I am in a difficult situation. Imagine the moral sufferings I had to endure for four or five days.

You are a man who can do great things. My affection for you has been doubled thereby.

I embrace you, my much-beloved brother and chief.

Ismet.

Ismet Pasha signed the Treaty on the 24 th July, 1923. The moment for congratulating him had arrived. On the same day I ad dressed the following telegram to him:

To His Excellency Ismet Pasha, Minister for Foreign

Affairs, President of the Delegation at Lausanne. You have brought the new mission entrusted to Your Excellency by the nation and the Government to a happy issue. You have thus crowned with a historic success a life which consists of a series of eminent services rendered to your country. At a moment when, after long struggles our country at last enjoys peace and indepen dence, I address my most thankful congratulations to Your Excellency for your brilliant services, to Riza Nur Bey and Hassan Bey, your honourable comrades, as well as to all members of the Delegation who have helped you in your task.

(Signed) Ghazi Mustapha Kemal,

President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,

Generalissimo.

Gentlemen, I had been informed that Rauf Bey, President of the Council, had not sent any congratulations. I reminded him that it was necessary to do so. Some of his comrades had made the same remark to him.

Later on I learnt that Rauf Bey, President of the Council, had thought it unnecessary either to congratulate Ismet Pasha on the im portant and historic work he had accomplished or to thank him for it.

Following the hints he had received, he wrote to Kiasim Pasha asking him to send a telegram to Ismet Pasha in his place . . . What could be the meaning of this step?

Kiasim Pasha received this letter at a moment when he was with Ichsan Bey (now Minister of Marine). Hasan Fehmi Bey, Minister of Finance, was also with him. All three of them composed a telegram of congratulation and thanks to Ismet Pasha in the name of Rauf Bey, put the draft into an envelope, and sent it to Rauf Bey.

The latter did not approve of the text, but composed, or had composed, another telegram to Ismet Pasha.

When Rauf Bey saw Kiasim Pasha he said to him:

“According to your composition of the text, it seems as though it was Ismet Pasha who has done everything down there; have we done nothing here?”

The contents of the telegram which Rauf Bey wrote, or rather had written for him, concealed neither his feelings nor his views.

If you desire it, I will submit this document verbally to you:

In cipher. 25 th July, 1923.

To the President of the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne.

Reply to your telegrams of the 2i st and 24 th July, Nos. 347, 348.

In spite of the armistice of Mudros which we signed to escape the numerous sufferings of the world war and for the purpose of actually proving the importance of our nation for the restoration of world peace, we have exposed ourselves to the most tragic and most cruel attacks which followed the Sdvres Treaty, and which trod our right of existence and our independence under foot. In view of the illegal and tragic attacks to which they were thus exposed the noble people of Turkey, who have lived free and in dependent for centuries, have risen, fully conscious of their right and their strength, for the purpose of defending their existence and their independence; and with their glorious and invincible armies under the leadership of our great President and Commander-in-Chief as well as our brave commanders, they have gone from victory to victory.

The success and the victories which the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Government have gained, thanks to the power and strength which they have sucked from the bosom of the nation and thanks to the eminent martial valour of their armies, have been crowned at last after long months of negotiation by a peace which constitutes their international consecration and which opens to our nation a new era of activity and tranquillity.

The Council of Ministers, appreciating the efforts displayed in the elaboration of a treaty which secures the right of existence and independence to our energetic Nation, which is always ready for sacrifices, address their congratulations to Your Excellency at the head, to Riza Nur Bey and Hassan Bey, our Delegates, as well as to our advisers. (Signed) Hussein Rauf,

President of the Council of Ministers.

Rauf Bey, taking the congratulations to Ismet Pasha, who had made and signed the Lausanne Treaty, as a pretext, believed it necessary to mention the armistice of Mudros which he had made and signed himself, and to explain in his defence what were the high and important considerations which had moved him.

The armistice of Mudros was the shameful result of the cruel defeat which the Ottoman Government suffered together with their allies. It was the stipulations of this armistice which exposed Ottoman territory to foreign occupation. It is the acceptance of the clauses of this armistice which has logically led foreign countries to believe that it would be possible in the same way to induce us to accept the stipulations of the Sevres Treaty.

Although Rauf Bey says that he signed this armistice in order “actually to prove the importance of our nation in the restoration of the world peace,” this phantastic phrase was not of a nature to convince and console anybody in the world except himself, because this intention was never in existence.

If we consider that Rauf Bey began his telegram with a reference to the quotation of the armistice of Mudros, we could be tempted to suppose that he wanted to make us believe that this armistice was a sort of preparation for the Lausanne Conference, and that the latter, on the whole, was a consequence of the Mudros act.

Rauf Bey in his telegram speaks of the attacks to which the Turkish nation was exposed through the Sevres Treaty; how the nation reacted to it, how they formed bold and invincible phalanxes, and how, under the leadership of glorious chiefs, they marched from victory to victory.

And it was just to Ismet Pasha, the one who had left the command of this same glorious army in order to go to Lausanne, that Rauf Bey relates this story.

And for the purpose of saying that these successes and victories are due to the Government, Rauf Bey uses a mode of expression which is a really God-sent one. Mentioning that the Lausanne Con ference has lasted for many a month, he cannot abstain from in sinuating that the affair had been drawn out. Congratulating the Delegation on their “endeavours in the elaboration of the Treaty,” he at the same time succumbs to his desire to explain the origin and the sense of the Treaty to the Delegation by giving a short history of the whole of the revolution, beginning with the Mudros Treaty.

The significance of this letter, which does not contain a single word of thanks, surely cannot escape anyone, inattentive and lacking in perspicacity though he might be. After their mission was accomplished our Delegation left to return to Angora. Everybody was impatient to express personally his esteem and thankfulness to the Delegates. On one of these days Rauf Bey, President of the Council, and Ali Fuad Pasha came to see me at Tshan Kaya.

Rauf Bey said: “I cannot see myself face to face with Ismet Pasha. I cannot go to meet and receive him. If you will allow me, I shall not be at Angora on his arrival, but shall start in the direction of Sivas and undertake a circular journey in my electoral district.”

I replied that there was no reason to justify such conduct; that he had to be present and receive Ismet Pasha in a manner that was due to the chief of the Government, and that he had to congratulate him by word of mouth for the successful accomplishment of his commission.

Rauf Bey answered that he was not master of himself and could not do it, and insisted on starting on his journey.

Kcmal Pasha 4 1 I consented under the condition that he resigned his office as President of the Council. Thereupon the following exchange of words took place between Rauf Bey and myself:

Rauf Bey: “Resigning from the Presidency of the Council I implore you to strengthen and consolidate the Supreme Office of the State.”

“Be absolutely sure,” I replied to Rauf Bey, “that I shaU do

what you say.”

I had very well understood what Rauf Bey wanted to say. The Supreme Office of the State he understood to be the Caliphate, and he begged me to secure more dignity and authority to that office.

It is, however, doubtful whether Rauf Bey had exactly under stood the meaning of my affirmative answer. Later on, after the proclamation of the Republic, I asked him in the course of a meeting which I had with him at Angora the reason for his opposition, and declared to him that what had happened was exactly what he had asked me to do when he left Angora, and what I had promised him to realise. He replied:

“Speaking of the strengthening of the Supreme Office of the State I did not consider for a monent or in any way the proclamation of the Republic.”

The meaning of the answer which I gave him, however, was exactly the same for me. In my opinion the actual cause of his weak ness was the fact that the administration of the State was entangled with that of the Grand National Assembly, and although the cha racter of our National Government was republican, this was neither definitely expressed nor announced.

Therefore it was of importance officially to proclaim the Republic at the first opportunity and to consolidate the situation by personify ing the Supreme Office of the State in the President of the Republic.

It was this that I had promised Rauf Bey to do. If he had not grasped my idea, I do not believe that blame could be imputed to me.

I had also a short exchange of opinion with Ali Fuad Pasha. He asked me the following question:

“Who are now your apostles ? May we know?”

I replied that I did not understand his question. Ali Fuad Pasha explained his thoughts to me. Then I made the following remark to him:

“I have no apostles. The apostles are those who serve this country and this nation, and who show capacity and strength in that service.” Rauf Bey resigned from the Presidency of the Cabinet. At the same time Ali Fethi Bey, Minister of the Interior, was elected Presi dent. ( 13 th August, 1923.)

Some time later, to be exact, the 24 th October, 1923, Ali Fuad Pasha retired from the Vice- Presidency of the Assembly and asked me to appoint him to be an Army Inspector.

I recommended him to maintain his functions, and pointed out to him that although he had the title of Vice-President, his position and his task were in reality those of the President of the Assembly, and that these func tions were very important.

He replied that he was not fond of politics, that he desired to dedicate himself to a military career, and begged urgently that his desire should be fulfilled. Fuad Pasha was Brigadier-General whilst there were commanders of Army corps in the Army, of which he was to take command, who had the rank of Divisional Commanders. In consideration of his former services, we appointed him Inspector of the Second Army, whose headquarters were at Konia, and conferred the rank of Divisional Commander on him.

Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha had also retired from the Assembly for the same reasons

Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha had also retired from the Assembly for the same reasons, and was already at the head of the First Army as Inspector. After the execution of the protocol for the evacuation which forms an addition to the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey was completely freed from foreign occupation, and had thus realised the integrity of her territory. It was a question of the future legally to fix the seat of the Government of New Turkey.

Considerations of all kinds categorically demanded that this seat could only be in Anatolia and at Angora.

Geographical and strategical position was of the very first im portance. The interior and exterior uncertainties had to be terminated by a possible speedy settlement of the seat of the State Government.

It is known that certain uncertainties had actually become ap parent, before or afterwards, on the question as to whether the seat of government should remain in Constantinople or whether it should be transferred to Angora. The Press published articles and comments about this.

Some of the new Deputies for Constantinople, with Refet Pasha at their head, used all their strength to prove the necessity that Constantinople must remain the capital, and they quoted some reasons in support of their assertions. They pretended that the town of Angora was in no way suitable on account of its climate, means of traffic, and the existing possibilities of installations and organi sations. They said that Constantinople must remain the capital and was destined to remain it. When we study the language they use with care, we must notice the difference which exists between the sense that we attribute to the expression “seat of the Government” and the point of view of those who used the expression “capital.” We had therefore to prove that this latter meaning had no longer any sense or right of existence in the new Turkish State by quoting the legal and official confirmation of our point of view which had already been settled.

Ismet Pasha, Minister for Foreign Affairs, introduced a bill in the Assembly, dated the 9 th October, 1923. This bill, which had fourteen other signatures, was passed on the 13^ October, after long discussion, by a great majority. The bill, read as follows: “The Seat of the Turkish State is the town of Angora.” Gentlemen, soon afterwards violent criticisms began to be launched against the Council of Ministers, which was presided over by Fethi Bey, and, above all, against Fethi Bey himself. It seemed as though the ambition of becoming Ministers had grown in certain deputies who were discontented with the Ministers in office.

Some other deputies, whose election, however, had been assured in the name of our party, stimulated the hostile movement against the Cabinet, with the intention of preparing the ground for their plans. The aim pursued by these deputies, who apparently prepared themselves to go over to the opposition, was noticeably to gain in fluence in the Government and the Assembly by completely mis leading the latter. For the purpose of being able to give his whole attention and energy to his authority as President of the Council, Fethi Bey retired from the Ministry of the Interior. At the same time the Vice- Presidency of the Assembly became vacant after the dismissal of Ali Fuad Pasha on the 24^ October, 1923.

A party came into existence that worked secretly and indepen dently without trying to establish either an agreement of views or a community of action with us. In the beginning they succeeded in gaining all the members of the party for their views by pretending to work sincerely and honestly. Thus, for instance, during a meeting of the party they succeeded in carrying through a resolution for the appointment of Sabit Bey, Deputy for Erzindjan, as Minister of the Interior, and Rauf Bey, who was at that time in Constantinople, Vice-President of the Assembly. (25 tl1 October, 1923.) I, however, had not approved of the appointment of Sabit Bey as Minister of the Interior. I was not of the opinion that the fact of having been Vali of some provinces was sufficient proof that Sabit Bey would be capable of conducting the interior affairs of New Turkey under the conditions demanded by the Revolution.

I also disapproved of Rauf Bey s appointment as Vice-President of the Assembly, because only the day before he had been President of the Council of Ministers.

We know the actions which had their origin in certain of his feel ings, and what were the reasons for his resigning the Presidency of the Cabinet.

The fact that, in spite of all, they wanted to enforce his appoint ment as Vice-President of the Assembly was a proof that they pursued the aim of showing that the whole of the Assembly was of his opinion, that is to say, against Ismet Pasha, who had concluded the Lausanne Treaty and who belonged to the Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The new Assembly risked from the very beginning running into the trap of a small faction that carried out a secret opposition. It was made impossible for Fethi Bey and his colleagues to direct the Government affairs quietly and unmolested. He repeatedly com plained to me about it and wanted to retire from the Cabinet. The other Ministers put forward the same complaints. The evil had its root in the Cabinet being formed by election of the Assembly. I had found out this truth long before this.

After I had discovered the existence of a secret opposition faction and ascertained that the work of the Assembly was dominated by personal sentiments, I came to the conclusion that the regular activity of the Government was daily disturbed for immaterial reasons and that the moment had arrived to carry out an idea for the realisation of which I had awaited a favourable moment. I must admit that. You will understand more easily the details and explanations which I will give you.

The day on which the People s Party had accepted the candida tures of Rauf Bey as Vice-President of the Assembly and of Sabit Bey as Minister for the Interior was Thursday, the 25 th October, 1923. On the same day and the following Friday the Council of Ministers met with me at Tshan Kaya.

I declared that the moment had arrived for Fethi Bey as well as for the other Ministers to resign, and that these resignations were absolutely necessary. We also adopted the principle that in case some of the dismissed Ministers should be re-elected by the Assembly, they should not enter the new Cabinet. Fewsi Pasha, Chief of the General Staff, who at that time, exactly as was the case with the other Ministers, was appointed by election, and who belonged to the Cabinet, was the only one who was not included in this decision. We agreed that the leadership and command of the Army could not be entrusted to a person appointed through casual election.

An examination of this procedure and this decision led us to the following result: We left every freedom of action for the forming of a new Cabinet to this ambitious faction. We saw no objection to letting them guide the destiny of the country in forming, according to their wish, a Cabinet consisting of persons who were agreeable to them, without letting those Ministers who were at that time in office participate in it. We were, however, sure that the faction would not be able to form a Cabinet and still less to govern the country if they should be successful in doing so. Should the ambitions faction who tried to deceive the Assembly be successful in this or that way in forming a Cabinet, we were of the opinion that it would be good to carefully follow for the time being the system and the capability of this Cabinet and even to help them.

In the eventuality, however, of the Government formed in this way proving incapable of administering the country, and deviating from the lines indicated by our new aims, the right thing for us to do would then be to disclose this fact and enlighten the Assembly.

It stands to reason that if the faction was not successful in the formation of a Cabinet the confusion resulting from it would serve to arouse the attention of the Assembly. As it would not be ad missible to prolong the crisis, I had the idea of personally interfering by putting the question as I had proposed and solving the affair by radical means.

As the result of our meeting at Tshan Kaya, the Council of Ministers sent in their resignations in the following letter which was signed by all of them.

“We are of the firm conviction that Turkey is absolutely in need of a very strong Cabinet, which possesses the absolute confidence of the Assembly, in order to bring the important and difficult task which she has to fulfil towards the interior as well as the exterior to a happy issue. We have therefore the honour of respectfully informing you that we send our resignations for the purpose of contributing to the formation of a Cabinet which in every respect enjoys the con fidence of the High Assembly and is supported by their co-operation.”

On the afternoon of Saturday, the 27 th October, this letter was communicated to the party in a full sitting which was held under my presidency and was read afterwards officially in the Assembly, which met on the same day at about 5 o clock. As soon as the re signation of the Cabinet was made known the deputies began to put up Ministerial lists, and met in groups either in the rooms of the As sembly or their private dwellings. This state of affairs lasted till the late hours of the 28^ October. No group was successful in putting up a list which would have been acceptable to the whole of the As sembly and suitable to be accepted favourably by the general opinion of the nation. Considering the respective candidates for each Ministry, they found themselves confronted by so many applicants that the difficulties in giving the preference to one of the lists which con tained certain names to another one, disheartened those who had charged themselves with making the lists and brought them to des pair. It is true that certain Constantinople journals did not lose the opportunity of attracting attention by the reproduction of the pictures of some individuals who were mentioned as “notable and honourable persons” and who would be suitable in their opinion of being chosen as President of the Council.

It is also true that an ardent journalist who arrived at the debar kation plank of Kalamish*) at a very early hour of the 28 th October met Rauf Bey on the way. The town was scarcely free from the veil which the morning mist had woven around it ; the sea reflecting the colours of the sky and the shore was still motionless; a ship of the Seiri Sefain**) crossed the calm bosom of the Marmora.”

The journalist enters the richly furnished drawing-room of a beautiful villa at Kalamish, situated in the centre of a large garden. He does not hesitate to enlighten public opinion by reproducing in his journal the views of the lord of the castle about different ques tions and especially the advice which he gave him to “protect our national sovereignty against exterior and interior.”

This opinion and advice, however, had no effect on Angora.

The individual who recommended the protection of the National sovereignty against exterior and interior was the same who regarded the benevolence of the Caliph as a “feature of Divine grace” !

*) Suburb of Constantinople on the Asiatic coast of the Marmora Sea. **) Turkish Navigation Company.

The telegrams published by some newspapers announcing the reception of Fuad Pasha, who was appointed for Konia, through Rauf Bey, Refet Pasha, Adnan Bey and other persons, on his arrival in Constantinople on the 28 th of the same month, as well as the repro duction of pictures of Rauf Bey and Kiasim Kara Bekir Pasha, and the publication of articles destined to revive the memory of the ar mistice of Mudros and the conquest of Kars, did not succeed in suf ficiently attracting attention to these persons.

At a late hour on the 28 th October I was asked by the leading Committee of the party to be present at their meeting which was then taking place. The President was Fethi Bey. He declared that the Comittee had put forward a list of the candidates and they had asked me, as President of the party, to come as they wanted to hear my opinion about it.

I ran through the list and declared that I approved of it, but also that the persons who were mentioned on it ought to be asked for their opinions. Everybody agreed to my proposal. Thus we asked, for example, Yussuf Kemal Bey, who came into question for the Foreign Ministry. He told us that he declined to accept this office. I concluded from this fact as well as from similar oc currences that the leading committee of the party also was not able to put forward a final and acceptable list.

I left the members of the committee, advising them to produce a final list after further con sultations with the persons who would come into question. It was already dark. At the moment I left the building of the Assembly to return to Tshan Kaya, I met Kemaleddin Sami Pasha and Halid Pasha in the lobby waiting for me. I had read in the papers under the heading of “Farewell and Reception Ceremonies” that these Pashas had arrived at Angora exactly on the very day of AH Fuad Pasha s departure. I had not seen them up to the hour of this meeting in the lobby. When I learned that they had waited till a late hour to see me, I asked them through Kiasim Pasha to come and dine with me. I also told Ismet Pasha, Kiasim Pasha as well as Fethi Bey to accompany me to Tshan Kaya. When I arrived at Tshan Kaya I found Fuad Bey, Deputy for Riza, and Rushen Eshred Bey, Deputy for Afium Kara Hissar, there who had also come to talk to me. I also asked them to stay to dinner. During the meal I declared: “Tomorrow we shall proclaim the Republic.” The Comrades present hastened to join in my opinion. We got up. Immediately afterwards I drafted a short programme of action containing the role which I assigned to each of the Comrades.

You will shortly hear details about the application of this pro gramme and the instructions which I gave. You have noticed, Gentlemen, that in order to decide on the pro clamation of the Republic it was neither necessary for me to call together all my Comrades nor to debate or discuss the question with them. I did not doubt that they were naturally and in principle of the same opinion as I was with regard to the chapter.

Some persons, however, who were not at Angora at this time and who, by the way, had nothing to say on this question, believed that they should use the fact that the Republic had been proclaimed, with out previously asking them and getting their consent, as a pretext for dissatisfaction and contradiction.

The Comrades who were with me this night left early. Only Ismet Pasha was my guest at Tshan Kaya. When we were left alone we drafted a law. The articles of the Constitutional Law of the 20 th January, 1921, referring to the State Constitution, I had altered as follows: At the end of the first article I added the sentence: The form of Government of the Turkish State is a Republic.” Article 3 was altered in the following way: “The Turkish State is administered by the Grand National Assembly. The latter directs the individual branches of the administration into which the Government is divided through the mediation of the Ministers.”

We drafted in addition the following articles for the purpose of making Articles 8 and 9 of the Constitutional Law more clear:

“The President of the Turkish Republic will be elected in a full sitting of the Grand National Assembly by its members and for the time of a legislative period.

“The mandate of the President lasts till the election of a new President. The President is eligible for re-election.

“The President of the Republic is the Chief of the State. In this capacity he presides over the National Assembly as well as the Council of Ministers when he believes it necessary.

“The President of the Council is elected by the Chief of the State from the members of the Assembly, after which the other Ministers will be elected by the President of the Council from among the said members.

“Thereupon the President of the Republic submits the list of the entire Cabinet to the Assembly for approval. If the Assembly is not sitting the approval will be postponed till the next sitting.”

The Commission and the Assembly added to these articles the article which is known to you concerning religion and language.

The great speech